Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities by Goldin, Owen
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of
1-1-1993
Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities
Owen Goldin
Marquette University, owen.goldin@marquette.edu
Published version. The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1993): 126-150. © Binghamton
University. Used with permission.
Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities 
Owen Goldin 
This paper is a discussion of one of the more 
neglected passages in the central books of Aristotle's 
Metaphysics E> 9 1051 a4-19 . In this passage Aristotle 
makes some assertions concerning relations that hold among 
potentialities and actualities, both good and bad. The~e 
assertions seem to be made as an afterthought, and theu 
relation to the analysis of potentiality and actuality that 
precedes is unclear. I shall argue that i~ this pass~ge 
Aristotle is in effect providing a metaphysical foundatiOn 
for the normative component of a teleological analysis of 
composite substance. 
I consider certain difficulties in reconciling the text 
with the account of potentiality and actuality presented 
earlier in Metaphysics e. I then briefly explore some of the 
implications that this passage has for our understanding of 
Aristotelian teleology. 
I 
In Metaphysics E> 9, 1051a4-19, Aristotle writes: 
It is clear from the following considerations 
that the actuality is better and more valuable 
(Kat ~EA:tirov Kat 'tl.!ltffi'tE pa) than t~e 
good ( cr1touoa { ac;) potentiality. Whatever IS 
126 
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said in respect to potentiality is such that the 
same thing is potentially contraries. For 
example, that which is said to be potentially 
healthy is the same as that which is said to 
be potentially ill, and these potentialities 
occur together. For the potentiality for being 
healthy is the same as that for being ill, and 
likewise for the potentialities of being at rest 
and changing, for building a house and 
demolishing it, and for being built up to be 
a house and for falling down. So the 
potentiality for the one contrary occurs 
together with the potentiality for the other 
('to 1-iEV ouv 86vacr8at 'tavav'tta Ci11a 
07t<ip:x,Et). But the contraries, such as being 
healthy and being ill, cannot occur together. 
It follows that necessarily one or the other of 
these is the good, but both potentialities have 
the same status as good, or neither does 
( cOO''t' av<iyKT] 'tOD'tffiV 8<i'tEpov d vat 
'taya8ov, 'tO BE 86vacr8at 611oiroc; 
a11$6'tEpov il o08€'tEpov). It follows that 
the actuality is better. But among bad 
things, the end and the actuality must be 
worse than the potentiality, for the same 
thing is potentially both contraries. 
It is therefore clear that there is no 
badness apart from things. For the bad is by 
its nature posterior to the potentiality. 1 
127 
1Here and elsewhere, all translations from the Greek 
are my own. 
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Aristotle begins by asserting his conclusion: 
a good potentiality is not as good as the actuality to which 
it is correlated. In what sense is a potentiality good? Is 
Aristotle talking about a potentiality for a good? Or is he 
talking about an ability or disposition that is good insofar 
as it is especially conducive to its correlative actuality? As 
often happens, the conclusion for which Aristotle is arguing 
becomes clear only by tracing the course of the argument. 
II 
This argument begins with the assertion that when-
ever a potentiality for some X inheres in a subject, the 
potentiality for the contrary of X likewise inheres in that 
subject. Aristotle presents the example of a living body. 
By virtue of being a living body, it has both the potentiality 
for good health and the potentiality for bad health. On 
what basis is Aristotle able to say that all potentialities are 
similarly correlated to contraries? Aristotle's reasons are 
presented in the previous chapter, e 8, in which he argues 
that actuality is prior to potentiality on the grounds that the 
necessary eternal motions, on which all other motions 
depend, involve no potentiality.2 This is so, he says, 
because "everything which is potentially admits of not being 
in actuality" (to 8uva-rov M 1tdv £v8€x.E-rat ~-til 
tvEpyEiv); accordingly, potential beings are perishable 
(1 050b 10-11 ). Here 8uva-r6v does not have the sense of 
the logically possible, that which is not impossible. Rather, 
it denotes a metaphysical principle of change, absent in 
respect to those features of a thing that do not change. Any 
2The reliance on this earlier argument is an indication 
that the argument of e 9 is not an unrelated observation 
simply tacked onto Metaph. e, as may first appear. 
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substrate_ of this sort of 8uva~-tt<; for some x will be such as 
can be either x or not x. 3 The contrary to any x will be 
the absence of x, within that substrate that admits of x. For 
the presence and absence of some characteristic are "those 
that are the most opposed to each other, of those that are in 
the_ s~e receptive ~ubject" (Metaph. ~ 10 1018a28-29). 
This Is why any subject that has the potentiality for X will 
also have the potentiality for the contrary of X. 
So ev~n though potentialities for contrary attributes 
cannot be Simultaneously actualized, they nevertheless 
accompan~ each other within the same subject. This is not 
problematical, a~ f~ as it goes. But in 0 9 Aristotle goes 
on to say t~at this IS why there is the same potentiality for 
~he contr~Ies. The basis on which Aristotle makes this 
mference. IS not clear. The statement is doubly puzzling 
because It seems to contradict points made earlier in 
Metaphysics e. 
. ~t . e 2 1046b4-24 Aristotle contrasts rational 
potent~al~t~es (those that are ~-tE-ra A.oyou) and nonrational 
potent_tah~Ies, on th~ g~ounds that while a potentiality of the 
first kmd_ Is ~potentiality for contraries, a potentiality of the 
second kmd Is correlative to only one actuality. While the 
hot has a potentiality to heat but not to chill and the cold 
has a potentiality to chill but not to heat, o~e with an art 
has ~he potentiality to produce both the product of that art 
and Its contrary. This point, familiar from Plato's Republic 
3See also Cat. 10 13a17-20: "When that which admits 
of contraries is present, it is possible for each contrary to 
change i~to the other, unless the one contrary belongs to 
some subject by nature, as hot belongs to fire." 
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(I 333E-334B)4 is explained by th~ fact that one with an art 
has an account by virtue of which one understands the 
cause of the coming-to-be of the product of that art. One 
would be in a position to ensure that the prod~ct of t?at art 
would be absent through the purposeful withholdmg or 
removal of the cause of that product. Because not ev~ry 
subject is such as can accept the product of t~at art, bemg 
deficient in respect to the product of that art IS .a ~ontrary, 
not a contradictory, to having that product. This IS .why a 
rational potentiality such as an art is correlative to 
contraries. . 
Hence rational potentialities stand m c~ntrast to 
nonrational potentialities, each of which is correlative to one 
and only one effect. Aristotle elsewhere makes cle~ that 
if a nonrational potentiality is brought tog~th~r .with an 
object on which it can produce its effect, It IS JUSt that 
effect, not its opposite, that will be produced.(Metaph. ~ 5 
1 048a6-7). But if an artisan and that on which. the artisan 
can work are brought together, it is not nece
5
ssarily.the c~se 
that the product of the art will come about. A thud thing 
. . d which Aristotle at e 5 1 048a1 0-11 calls the IS requue , . . 
authority (to KUptOv), identified as the desue or c?~Ice 
(opE~tc; i\ 7tpoaipEcrtc;) of the artisan, which ~etermmes 
whether or not the means for the artistic productiOn would 
4Cf. Meno 87E-88D and Ion 531D-532B. 
sAt Metaph . 8 8 1050b30-34, as ~~1~, Aristot~~ 
contrasts nonrational and rational potenttahtles on. th1 basis . He indicates that the only respec~ in which a ~mg .e 
nonrational potentiality will be correlative to opposites . ts 
insofar as its presence and absence would lead to oppostte 
results. 
Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities 131 
be present. In the case of Aristotle's example, a physician 
will be the one who knows what human health is, and, as 
long as the patient is curable, can provide the conditions for 
the actualization of health. But by virtue of that same 
knowledge, the physician knows how to withhold these 
conditions, and assure that health is not actualized. Instead 
disease would be actualized. For on the Aristotelian 
understanding, disease is not an actuality unto itself, as it 
sometimes is for us, when it is the flourishing of a certain 
microbe. Rather, it is the body's state when its potentiality 
for health is not actualized (Metaph. H 5 1044b29-346). 
6Aristotle ' s account in H 5 is actually a bit more 
complicated than this . The body is said to be related to 
health and disease as is water to wine and vinegar; in each 
case the latter two terms are the contraries to which the 
first term is related as matter. In each case "It is the 
matter of the one in respect to disposition (€~tc;) and form, 
and it is the matter of the other in respect to privation and 
perishing contrary to nature" (1044b32-34) . Thus, the 
body without the form of health is diseased. To preserve 
the analogy, it should follow that any water without the 
form of wine is vinegar . This of course is not so . 
Aristotle posited water as an element, with its own nature , 
and vinegar as a compound (J..Li~tc;) of water and earth, in 
which there is a preponderance of water (Mete. IV 7 
384a3-16, 10 389a7-ll). The continuation of the passage 
is even more puzzling. It is a corpse which is said to be 
related to the body as is vinegar to water. Aristotle seems 
to be saying that a body, as such, is alive, for it is the 
corpse (not the body) which is said to be the matter of the 
living body . Aristotle apparently gives health and life 
equal status as being a positive state . Likewise disease .and 
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Returning to e 9, we see that one of Aristotle's 
examples of a single potentiality that is a potentiality for 
contraries is indeed an instance of a rational potentiality: the 
potentiality that allows one to build a house is that which 
allows one to demolish a house. (This is explained by the 
fact that one must know the cause of the internal coherence 
and stability of a house in order to build one. With such a 
being a corpse have here an equal status as privation. The 
thought seems to be that disease is partial death, through 
(partial) absence of form, allowing the organized body to 
fall back into a mass of unorganized chemical constituents. 
The identification of the body and the living body rests on 
the thesis, prominent in Metaph. H, that matter and the 
form that it admits constitute a unity in such a way that the 
matter, as such, is not what it is apart from this form. On 
this account, the matter that pre-exists the composite 
substance no longer exists, except "potentially." (Some 
have taken this teaching to play a key role in the resolution 
of the puzzles of Metaphysics Z and H. See, for example, 
M. L. Gill, Aristotle on Substance: the Paradox of Unity 
[Princeton, 1989].) Leaving this issue aside, it is clear that 
the analogy with water, wine, and vinegar is forced in 
another respect. Though the water of the wine is not an 
independent constituent in the wine, there can be water as 
such that is not wine. But even if we disregard the 
difficulties involved with the vinegar example, because 
Aristotle is not always consistent on the question of the 
pre-existence and survival of matter as such, this passage 
alone does not tell against the thesis that within Metaph. 
8, the contrary to an actualized form is simply the 
privation of that form within the matter that accepts the 
form . 
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knowledge its coherence and stability can be easily 
removed.) But how are the other examples to be accounted 
for? 
We n?t~ th~t when Aristotle states the principle that 
every potentiality Is the principle of only one change, he 
concentrates on those principles that he takes to be 
pot~ntialities in the strict sense of the term: principles of 
~otlon or ~h~ge in something else or in a thing itself 
msofar as It IS something else. These are the active 
po~entialities, such as heat, cold, or the soul. In e 1 
Aris~otle distinguishes these from passive potentialities. A 
passive potentiality is that feature of a substrate that is the 
princip!e of its being acted upon and changed, were it to 
come mto requisite contact with the correlative active 
potentiality (0 1 1046all-13). These are said to be 
potentialities in a secondary sense, for they are both 
conceptually and ontologically derivative from active 
potentiali~ies (1046a1_5-_I?). We note that e 9's examples 
of no~_at10nal pote~tlalitles that are correlative to contrary 
actualities are passive potentialities. This is clear in the 
case of the potentiality for being built up and for being 
knocke~ down. Less clear are the cases of the potentialities 
for mot10n and rest, and for health and disease. For motion 
can be a natural process, of which the source is within the 
subject, as can progress towards health. On the other hand 
both cases can be passive processes, as in the cases of bein~ 
healed through surgery and what Aristotle calls "violent" 
motion. And even in those cases in which the motions are 
natural, Aristotle makes an ontological distinction between 
the active and passive aspects of the substance undergoing 
natural change (Physics VIII 4 254b7-33). 
We have seen that in e 2 and 5 Aristotle makes 
explicit why a single rational potentiality is correlated to 
contrary actualities. He nowhere gives such an explicit 
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account as to why this is also the case for a single passive 
potentiality. But one can be reconstructed. Ontologically, 
the potentiality to be acted upon is nothing other than the 
nature of the substrate of that potentiality, which renders it 
susceptible to the action of active potentialities. For 
example, any body is such as can be chilled or heated. 
Which occurs depends on the active potentiality of that with 
which it comes in contact, not on anything internal to the 
subject about to be heated or cooled. There is no 
metaphysical principle of being heated apart from that of 
being cooled. This will also be the case for those passive 
potentialities correlative to complex actualities, such as 
health and disease. 
I suggest that Aristotle' s assertion that the same 
potentiality is correlated to contrary actualities holds for 
both rational potentialities and passive potentialities. One 
may well ask why Aristotle does not come out and say this, 
if this is indeed his meaning. Why does he not explicitly 
assert that this principle does not hold for the remaining 
logical possibility, that of two active potentialities, 
correlated to contrary actualities? 
I propose that this is because, in the last analysis, 
Aristotle does not admit that such a case is metaphysically 
possible. Whenever there is a pair of contrary actualities, 
there be a real metaphysical principle of causation for only 
one of these. For only one actuality is there a real active 
potentiality by virtue of which this actuality emerges. The 
other actuality is merely what is predicated of the substrate 
when this substrate does not stand in the required relation 
to such potentiality, or when the active potentiality is in 
some way otherwise prevented from doing its work. 
For suppose that there is a substrate S for some 
passive potentiality for X. Let Y be the contrary to X, 
which will be predicated of S to the extent to which X is 
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absent. 7 We have seen that Aristotle asserts that when the 
nonr~tional active potentiality for X stands in the right 
re!atwn to th~ passive potentiality for X, the potentialities 
will be actualized, and X will be predicated of S. But if 
these two potentialities do not stand in the right relation or ?o so only to a certain extent, the privation of X is inhe;ent 
m S. The privation of X, the absence of X in a subject 
such as to admit X, will be the contrary of X. So to the 
extent. to whic~ the condition of having the potentialities 
stand m a certam relation is not met, Y will be inherent in 
X. . To return to the example of health, the matter of a 
sa~lmg has the potentiality for attaining the final cause of 
?emg a t~ee, ~hat is, for being all and doing all that is 
m~olved m bemg a mature, flourishing tree. We can call 
this goal the healthy life of the tree. (Health is the 
permanent state by virtue of which this life 1s led; it in turn 
co~es about. t~o~gh the living of a healthy life.) The 
active potentiality Is the form of the tree, its soul, already 
7
In.Cat. 10 12al-30, 12b27-35, Aristotle distinguishes 
contranes that have intermediates from those that do not. 
Thus, for .some pairings of contraries X and Y it is possible 
for a s~b~ect to be partially X and partially y, and for 
others, It IS not. Aristotle presents health and disease as an 
example of a pair of contraries with no intermediate but 
surely this is a linguistic point, indicating the lack of a ~erm 
~o deno.te an intermediate, as "grey" denotes an 
mtermediate between white and black. For it is manifest 
that one can be healthy to a greater or lesser extent. 
Another possibility is that health, considered as an 
actualization ?f su~stantial essence, would, in the early 
phase of Anstotle s thought to which the Categories 
belongs, be an ali-or-nothing predicate. 
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within the sapling. If the sapling is not given enough water 
or light, it will be unable to fully meet this goal. The tree's 
active potentiality will be prevented from standing in the 
appropriate relation to its passive potentiality. To that 
extent it will have predicated of it the contrary of the 
"healthy life," that is, it will be living in an unhealthy way. 
In such a case there is no need to posit an active 
potentiality for the contrary of X. Those agencies that do 
seem to be actively responsible for the contrary of X (such 
as drought or logging, in the case of the tree) can be 
understood as having their causal power because they make 
impossible the proper functioning on S of the active 
potentialities for X. 
It should therefore be no surprise that in the 
argument being considered Aristotle omits considering the 
possibility of two different potentialities, each directed 
toward one of a pair of contrary actualities. 
III 
Aristotle's assertion in 0 9 that the same potentiality 
is in respect to contraries is made to clarify the various 
relations that hold among good actualities, bad actualities, 
good potentialities, and bad potentialities. Aristotle makes 
clear in the Categories that goodness and badness are 
examples of contrary attributes for which there are 
intermediate attributes between them (Cat. 1 0 12a 13-17, cf. 
11 13b36-14a6). It follows that it is the same rational 
active potentiality for good and bad results. Again, 
Aristotle's example of health and disease sheds light on 
this: the art of medicine is a potentiality making possible 
both the healing of a patient, presumably a good in some 
noncontroversial sense, and the poisoning or infecting of a 
patient, likewise something patently bad. Again, the passive 
potentialities for goods are likewise potentialities for those 
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ba~ charac~eristics that are their contraries. For both 
ratwn~l ~ctlve and nonrational passive potentialities, the 
potentiality as such will be neutral between goodness and 
badness. Because the potentiality for the good and for the 
bad are one and the same, and both are neutral in respect to 
goodn_ess. and badness, Aristotle asserts that the good 
~ctuality 1s bett~r than its potentiality, and the bad actuality 
1s worse than 1ts potentiality. For, presumably, in some 
sense the good actuality is good and the bad actuality is 
ba~, but all of the potentialities involved are in themselves 
ne1ther good nor bad. 
. . Here, two points need to be made in passing. First, 
1t 1~ n?w clear that the good potentiality, which in the 
begmrung of our passage is said not to be as good or 
~aluable a~ ~he actuality, must be understood as good 
msofar_ as 1t 1s a potentiality for some good. Second, the 
neutrali~ of the potentiality in respect to goodness or 
badness 1s contrasted with the case of actualities because in 
that case, _Ar~stotle says, one must be good a~d the other 
bad. . !h1s 1s a rather strong claim. Will not many 
actualities be neutral in respect to goodness and badness? 
We need to return to this point. 
Aristotle concludes by inferring that "it is therefore 
clear_ that th~re i_s no badness apart from things. For the 
b~d 1s postenor m nature to the potentiality." What does 
th1s me~, and on what grounds is it argued? 
. Fust, what problem is this meant to address? In the 
prevwus _ch~pt~r, Aristotle had argued that actuality is prior 
~o potenttahty m 'A6yoc,, in time, and in oocria. But if this 
1s so, a problem arises in the cases of good actualities that 
are co~relative to contrary bad actualities. For, as we have 
seen~ m the case of rational potentialities and nonrational 
pass1ve p~tentialities, a good actuality and its contrary, a 
bad actuahty, share one and the same potentiality. It would 
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appear, then, that both the good and .the bad actualities 
share the status of priority in A.6yoc,, time, and oucr{a to 
the potentiality to which they are both correlated. This 
would entail a kind of metaphysical Manicheism, according 
to which both good and bad principles are implicit in a 
complete account of a potentiality, temporarily precede its 
coming-to-be, and are implicitly present as form and final 
cause within the being that has this potentiality. With the 
possible exception of his account of the hot, the cold, the 
wet and the dry,8 nothing in Aristotle's writings prepares 
us for this vision of pairs of competing, equal, and opposite 
forms and final causes. 
To argue against this possibility, Aristotle presents 
as a premise "the bad is posterior in nature to the 
potentiality." How is this to be argued for? A~a~n, we 
need to consider three different cases. The potentiality for 
the badness, which is said to be posterior to this badness, 
can either be a rational potentiality, a passive nonrational 
potentiality, and/or an active nonration~l potentiali~y.. . 
As we have seen, a single ratwnal potentiality 1s 
correlative to both a good and a bad actuality because the 
rational agent who has a A.6yoc, expressing the cause of 
some possible end thereby also has the A.6yoc, of the 
privation of the cause of this end, and so is best ab~e to 
keep the end unactualized. Here it is clear that the ratwnal 
potentiality is prior in A.6yoc,, time, and being to the b~d 
actuality correlated to that potentiality. One can explam 
how to make one unhealthy only by negating the account of 
80n the other hand, at GC 1.3 318bl7-20 Aristotle 
suggests that hot may be a positive attribute and cold a 
privation, but the suggestion is made tentatively, for 
purposes of illustration. 
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how to preserve and produce health; thus the account of 
health is prior in A.6yoc, to the account of the ability to 
induce disease. Likewise the medical art (which in turn is 
posterior to actual health both in time and in essence) must 
already exist before it is employed to make patients 
unhealthy. Hence we have the temporal priority of the 
potentiality, as well as priority in oucr{a, taken either in the 
sense of definitional essence or in the sense of reality. 
The situation of nonrational potentialities correlated 
with good or bad actualities is simpler. Since the good 
actuality X and the bad actuality Y are contraries, there will 
be the same passive potentiality for each. Y is simply the 
absence of X in the subjectS, which is such as to admit of 
X. Y is therefore conceptually and metaphysically 
derivative on S, which is defined as that with the 
potentiality for X. Likewise, as we have seen, Aristotle 
would be led to deny the existence of a separate active 
nonrational potentiality for Y. Y, the bad actuality, is 
simply what one has when the relevant nonrational passive 
potentiality for X, the good actuality, is not actualized. In 
the case of active nonrational potentialities, too, the bad 
actuality will be metaphysically and conceptually posterior 
to the single potentiality involved. 
IV 
We have seen evidence for attributing to Aristotle 
the view that, with possible exceptions at the elemental 
level, all contraries are such that one is a positive attribute 
and the other the privation of that attribute. The actualized 
privation has no contrary with any independent ontological 
status. Certain such privations are called "bad" insofar as 
they are contrary to other actualities, called "good." 
Before exploring the philosophical ramifications of 
this view, it would be good examine one more passage in 
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which Aristotle seems to be putting forward a similar 
teaching. At Physics I 9 Aristotle contrasts his account of 
the principles of change with the Platonic account. "The 
others" posit only two such principles, on the one hand, "the 
Great and the Small," which is the analogue to Aristotle' s 
matter, and, on the other, a principle analogous to 
Aristotelian form. They are said to have erred in 
maintaining that what is one in number is one in 86va1.w;. 
Accordingly, the only principles required for two contraries 
X and Y would be the principle of X and the principle of 
Y. Of any such pair, the principle of one would be form, 
and that of the other would be the Great and the Small. 
They overlook the other nature. For there is 
that cause which remains and, along with the 
form (JlOP~Tl) is responsible for the things 
that come to be, in a maternal way. But, to 
the one paying attention to the malignant 
aspect of it (npoc; 'tO KaKonmdv atm1c;),9 
9Simplicius (Physics 249 .6-11), Philoponus (Physics 
186.25-187 .17), Themistius (Physics 32.30-33 .5) , and 
W. D. Ross, Aristotle 's Physics: A Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 
1936), pp . 348, 497, take KaKo1rot6v to mean "causing 
perishing," referring to the tendency of a privation of form 
to lead to the onset of cj>Oop&. But it need not be so 
narrowly construed. After all, the passage is conside~ing 
the role of privation in the process of coming-into-bemg, 
before there is anything that can perish. Accordingly, I 
follow Charlton, Aristotle's Physics: Books I and II 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1970), pp. 21 , 82, in giving_the 
phrase the sense of "evil ," or, more literally , "responsible 
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the other part of the opposition often appears 
not to exist at all. For while there is 
something divine and good and desired, we 
say that on the one hand the contrary to this 
exists, and on the other hand, that there 
exists that which by nature desires and 
craves this, according to its nature. But for 
them it turns out that the contrary craves its 
perishing. Yet the form cannot desire itself, 
since there is no need, nor can the opposite 
desire the form, since contraries are 
destructive of each other. But that which 
desires the form is matter, just as the female 
might desire the male, or the ugly might 
desire the beautiful. But in this case, the 
matter would be female or ugly only 
accidentally. (192al2-25) 
141 
There is a great deal going on in this famous 
passage. Three main questions present themselves. First, 
exactly what is the argument against the Platonists, stripped 
of metaphorical embellishment and normative talk? Second, 
what sense can be given to the apparent identification of all 
actualities as good? Third, do the roles played by goodness 
and badness in this passage lend support to the 
interpretation of good and bad actualities, sketched above? 
On Aristotle' s account, the Eleatic argument that 
nothing comes from nothing convinced the Platonists that 
there needs to be something underlying change, which is 
not the same as the end of the change. But insofar as they 
for badness," where badness can, as we have seen, simply 
be the absence of some actuality considered good. 
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hold to the mistaken principle that a single thing can ~~ve 
only one potentiality, they were blinded to the recogmtwn 
of passive potentialities, and hen~e to the substr~te ~f 
passive potentialities, matter. Their OWI_l a~cou~t, Identi-
fying the persistent substrate with the pnvatwn, IS wh~lly 
inadequate, for it left unexplai~ed what _metaphysical 
principle within this substrate IS responsible for ~he 
progression from the privation to the_ contrary. No ?emg 
has within itself an internal need for Its own destructiOn. 
The second and third questions must be approached 
jointly. In our passage Aristotle_ again supplements a 
consideration of potentiality' actuality' and change, by the 
consideration of goodness and badness. Ther~ are two 
aspects of this. First, the privation. is consider~d as 
responsible for badness, and it is for this reason, ~nstotle 
says, that one is tempted to say that it does not e~Ist ~t al_L 
Second, the actuality that is the contrary of the pnva~wn IS 
considered something good, and on this basis ~Istotle 
presents a series of metaphors and examples to clanfy the 
relations holding among a substrate, a privation, ~d a form. 
Aristotle does not himself take the position that a 
privation does not exist at a~l. . It doe_s have a sort ?f 
ontological status: it is that which I_s pre~Icated of a certam 
substrate in which the positive attnbute_Is ab~ent. It has _a 
sort of shadow status. As an absence, It, unhke matter, IS 
a non-being in itself (o0K ov Ka8' a0-rf1v: 192a4-5). On 
the Other hand Aristotle insists that, unhke that of the 
' • II ( 0 J.lEY Platonists, "we say that the contrary . . . exists . 't 
E:vav-riov ~aKEV dvat, 192a17-18). Were this not s?, 
Aristotle would not have been taking pains to arg~e ~hat ~f 
along with the substrate, must be counted as a pnnciple h 
change. It is rather the Platonists who move from t e 
. . · b I. ng What sense "malignance" of the pnvation to Its non- e . 
can be made of such an inference? 
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The answer can be only speculative, since the first 
explicit Platonic argument identifying evil and nonbeing 
seems to be that of Plotinus (Ennead 2.4), who employs the 
Aristotelian conceptual machinery of matter, potentiality, 
and actuality to argue for this conclusion. But we can be 
reminded that, at least in the metaphysics of the Republic, 
it is the form of the Good that is ultimately responsible for 
all being. This is, as Santas has shown, 10 the form 
responsible for the "ideal attributes" such as intelligibility 
and immutability that belong to forms as such. One could 
consider it the form of Being, in the strict sense. It would 
follow that any being, in the strict sense, would be good, 
and hence productive of good. So to the extent to which 
something is malignant, it is not! 
We might be tempted to read Aristotle as taking all 
talk of goodness in a metaphysical context as a kind of 
superstitious Platonism. But Aristotle does not argue in this 
way. He joins the Platonists in calling the positive term of 
change something "divine, good, and desired." His 
argument is only that we need to distinguish the bad in 
itself, which is merely the absence of the good within a 
certain substrate, and perishes when that good comes to be, 
from the substrate which, prior to the change, happens to be 
bad, but, on account of its own nature (presumably, on 
account of its passive potentiality, and, in some cases 
perhaps, on account of a natural active potentiality) 
becomes good in this process of change. 
10
G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's 
Republic, " in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, v. 2, 
eds. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1983), pp. 232-263. 
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From this it is clear that for any change from one 
contrary to another, one of these contraries is form and the 
other is the contrary of the form. Aristotle calls the for~ 
good; accordingly the contrary is bad. We now see why, m 
the passage from Metaph. e 9 that ~e have be_en 
considering, Aristotle says that of every pau of contraries 
one is good and the other is bad: the positive attribute or 
form is, as such, good. 
The text is clear evidence that those actualities that 
are bad in a nontheoretical way are privations of certain 
"good" actualities. Of any good/bad pair, one m~st_ be the 
privation and one must be a positive form. And It IS cle~ 
that Aristotle accepts without question the general thesis 
that badness, when it exists, is caused by some kind of 
privation. Aristotle follows the Platonists in rejecting 
metaphysical Manicheism. 
v 
I now turn to some implications the above account 
has for our understanding of Aristotelian teleology. 
Two major problem areas in the metaphysics of 
Aristotle's teleology have surfaced. First, to what extent 
does a teleological account commit one to positing_ be~~s 
other than those posited by a strictly physicalistic 
account?' 1 Second, what are the metaphysical implications 
11There is extensive literature devoted to this question. 
Representative arguments for the irreducibility of form (to 
which appeal is made within a teleological ac~ount) ca~ be 
found in A. Gotthelf, "Aristotle's ConceptiOn of Fmal 
Causality" in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biol~gy, 
eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambndge 
University Press, 1987), pp. 204-242, and J. Cooper, 
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of the normative element of a teleological explanation? We 
explain a feature of a living thing by indicating that it is for 
the sake of the good of that being. What is this goodness? 
Can it be identified in non-normative language with some 
feature of the being in question? Clearly the resolution of 
this aspect of Aristotle's meta-biology will have large 
implications for the metaphysical foundations of Aristotelian 
ethics. For this aspect of Aristotelian teleology will 
determine the relation between is-statements and ought-
statements, and accordingly will shed light on exactly how 
Aristotle grounds his account of the human good on his 
account of human nature. 
In regard to this second question, there appear to be 
two main alternatives. According to the first, goodness is 
a real irreducible attribute of things; a complete account of 
something that is good will need to mention its goodness, 
in addition to all of its other attributes. On the other 
account, the goodness of a being is to be identified with 
some other characteristic of that being, which can be 
accounted for in non-normative language. Such an account 
"Aristotle on Natural Teleology," in Language and Logos, 
eds. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 197-222. 
Arguments for some kind of ontological reducibility of 
form can be found in M. Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu 
Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and 
Interpretive Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), pp. 59-106, and R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and 
Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 1980), pp. 155-174. 
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was suggested by Balme12 and has been fully argued for 
by Gotthelf. 13 According to this account, the good of a 
being is simply the actualization of all of its irreducible 
potentialities, determined by that being ' s form. So if 
teleological explanation proceeds by showing how some 
attribute or activity is for the sake of an organism' s good, 
it in effect shows how this attribute or activity either makes 
possible or facilitates the activities in which that organism 
can by nature engage. 
The two sets of problems are to a certain extent 
interrelated. If a complete explanation of the activities and 
characteristics can in principle be given by identifying the 
underlying material stuffs and their natural characteristics, 
both form as such and goodness as such would be 
dispensable in explanation, and neither would be present in 
an inventory of the basic ontological constituents of that 
organism. This is to be expected, since the final cause, 
which Aristotle identifies with the good, is also identified 
with the form. On the other hand, if the form is not a 
12D. M . Balme, "Teleology and Necessity , " in 
Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's Biology, eds . A. Gotthelf 
and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), p. 277 . 
13 A. Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final 
Causality , " in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's Biology, 
eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), pp . 233-234, and "The Place of 
the Good in Aristotle's Natural Teleology," in Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, v. 4, 
eds . J. Cleary and D . Shartin (Latham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1989), pp. 113-139. 
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being unto itself, but a set of motions of the elements that 
are not on account of the natures of those elements, 14 we 
could still posit goodness as such as a basic irreducible 
characteristic of these motions. Still, whether one posits 
form as a per se being or identifies it as a set of motions, 
it is possible to deny to goodness any independent 
irreducible status. 15 
14This was the final proposal of Balme, in "Teleology 
and Necessity," pp. 282-285, and in "Aristotle's Biology 
was Not Essentialist," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle 's 
Biology eds. A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press , 1987) pp. 292-293 . 
15Thus the passage from Physics I 9 discussed above 
can be read as developing an extended analogy, involving 
no attribute of goodness as such to form . Supporting this 
reading is the fact that, within his biological and 
psychological writings, Aristotle is clear that desire 
(opE~u;), in the strict sense, is a faculty possessed only by 
animals (DA II 3 414a29-b16) . But there are many 
substrates of change that are not animals. So in saying that 
something is good we are saying that there is some 
substrate which is related to it as is the substrate of desire 
towards the object or attribute desired. One version of 
such an account would posit goodness as nothing but the 
object of desire (cf. NE I 1 1094a1-3). Any ascription of 
goodness would thereby be dependent on the speaker's 
interests, or desires. Goodness as such would have no 
independent ontological status . When we call something 
good we are simply saying that we, the speakers, have a 
certain potentiality of desire directed towards it, or we are 
indulging in a bit of harmless anthropomorphization in 
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One objection that has been raised to the Balme/ 
Gotthelf account of teleology is that Aristotle grants the 
existence of both good and bad actualities, and that it is an 
essential, and often reiterated condition of an Aristotelian 
teleological explanation that it show how some attribute, 
organ, or activity of a being contribute to the good of that 
being. 16 Accordingly, a teleological explanation does more 
than show that something comes about on account of some 
"irreducible potentiality." 
One of the results of the present paper is that a 
careful consideration of those few texts in which Aristotle 
does consider the relationships that hold among goodness, 
badness, potentiality, and actuality shows that this objection 
ascribing such desire to some other substrate. 
16See J. Cooper, "Aristotle on Natural Teleology," in 
Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
Presented to G. E. L. Owen, eds. M. Schofield and M. C. 
Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p. 197, and C. Kahn, "The Place of the Prime 
Mover in Aristotle's Teleology," in Aristotle on Nature and 
Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies 
Presented to David M. Balme on his Seventieth Birthday 
ed. A. Gotthelf (Pittsburgh and Bristol: Mathesis, 1985), 
pp. 197-198. 
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is unfounded. 17 Badness is simply the privation of some 
actuality that is good. 
The refutation of this objection does not in itself 
clinch the case that there is nothing metaphysically involved 
in goodness other than actuality as such. There is another 
key objection, which I am not able to here address. This is 
that Aristotle sets up a hierarchy of actualities, so that some 
are of more value or have a greater share of the divine than 
others. 18 Is this simply an extension of the metaphor of 
the scale of nature, by which some beings have greater 
complexity and a quantitatively greater range of actualities 
than others?19 Or is the high regard in which Aristotle 
holds those actualities that involve awareness continuity 
, ' 
and eternity a sign of an irreducibly normative element 
within his ontology? A third possibility, which we cannot 
dismiss out of hand, is that Aristotle never gave sustained 
attention to this issue, to which we, living in the shadow of 
the is/ought distinction, are inevitably drawn. 
However we deal with this difficulty, it should be 
clear that Aristotle did gives some sustained attention to the 
17In "The Place of the Good, " pp. 116-17, Gotthelf 
defends himself against Kahn's criticism by pointing out 
imprecisions in Kahn's expression of the objection, but 
does not directly address the question of the metaphysical 
status of good and bad actualities as such. 
18Relevant passages (such as GA II 3 736b29-33, PA 5 
645b22-25 and Metaph. A 7 1032b13-30) are discussed by 
Gotthelf in "The Place of the Good," pp. 127-31. 
19This is the suggestion of Gotthelf, "The Place," 
p. 128. 
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role of goodness within his teleological account of 
substance. In so doing, he showed the basic strategy for 
integrating an account of goodness and badness with his 
account of actuality and potentiality . . 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the 
Metaphysical Society of America, at Notre Dame University, 
March 13, 1993 and to the Society for Ancient Greek 
Philosophy, in Kansas City, May 6, 1994. I thank all of 
those who responded to that version in public and in 
private. Special thanks are due to David 0 'Connor, for the 
probing insights and challenges of his prepared comment 




The occasion for this note is the publication of a 42-page 
pamphlet: 
Elizabeth Ann Ambrose, The Hermetica: An Annotated 
Bibliography, #30 in the Sixteenth Century Bibliography 
series, published by the Center for Reformation Research, 
St. Louis, MO, 1992. 
It is a useful publication: Ambrose reviews the history of the 
texts (and manuscripts), especially as that history would be seen 
from a sixteenth century perspective, and provides one-paragraph 
accounts of about twenty-six books, monographs, dissertations, and 
articles on Hermetica. It is also rather selective; there is no 
attempt to be exhaustive. One crucially important publication that 
Ambrose does not discuss (although it is mentioned parenthetically, 
p. 32) is: 
Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to 
the Late Pagan Mind, Cambridge University Press 1986. 
For people working in Neoplatonism, this book is an excellent 
introduction to Hermetism, since it places the Hermetic texts very 
effectively into the milieu of late antiquity. Fowden carefully 
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